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Abstract
10 The characterisation of anthropogenic climate change as a violation of basic human rights is gaining
wide recognition. Many people believe that tackling this problem is exclusively the job of
governments and supranational institutions (especially the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change). This argument can be traced back to the delegated authority model, according
to which the legitimacy of political institutions depends on their ability to solve problems that
15 are difficult to address at the individual level. Since the institutions created to tackle climate change
fail to do so, their legitimacy is under great pressure and can only be saved by considerations of
feasibility. We argue that democratically elected representatives are able to claim that a more robust
climate policy is unfeasible, but only because the mandate we as citizens grant them is very restrictive.
Instead of shifting responsibility for the thoroughly inadequate response to climate change fully
20 to political representatives, we should highlight the failure of the political community as a whole to
fulfil its responsibility at the input-side of the delegation of authority. When individual voters fail to
fulfil the minimal obligation to at least vote for parties that explicitly advocate robust climate policies,
they cannot hide behind the delegated authority argument, but should accept their complicity in the
massive violations of basic human rights caused by the failure to successfully tackle climate change.
25
Keywords: climate change; delegated authority; responsibility; feasibility; moral
disengagement
Climate change represents one of the most serious and far-reaching challenges facing
humankind in the 21st century. Nevertheless, the response to it is characterised by
30 inaction at all levels. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the harmful
effects of climate change are outrightly denied or blamed on natural processes,
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scientific uncertainties are overly emphasised, and evidence is discredited. Many
claim either ignorance or that it is not their fault.1 Regarding their engagement in
greenhouse gas emitting activities, emitters maintain that it makes no difference whether
35 they do it or don’t and that any way, everybody does it.2 They also claim not to have
any alternative because their economy is completely dependent on fossil fuels, or
because the social and cultural context in which they are embedded imposes values
and expectations that inescapably influence their choices and actions. Finally, many
people believe that addressing climate change is exclusively the job of others*
40 primarily the government and supranational institutions.
In this paper, we will focus on this last argument and evaluate to what extent it is
legitimate. More specifically, we will assess the explanation for the ubiquitous inaction
that refers to the delegated authority model.3 Although it remains largely implicit in
political theory, this model underpins the legitimacy of political institutions and their
45 leaders, depending on their ability to solve problems that are difficult to address at
the individual level. Since the institutions created to abate the significant threat
climate change poses to basic human rights fail to do so, their legitimacy is seriously
questionable. The only way they might still claim to be legitimate is by appealing to
considerations of feasibility. If the implemented policy turns out to be the best one
50 available under the current circumstances, the institutions would arguably be no
longer blameworthy for the failure to provide a robust response to climate change. The
question thus arises: how should we evaluate the options open to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the states that constitute
this institution (the Parties to the UNFCCC), and the citizens of these states?
55 More specifically, we will examine whether the failure to design a policy that
respects basic human rights is due to unwillingness on the part of the political
representatives or due to genuine unfeasibility. In answering this question, we will
pay special attention to the input-side of the delegated authority model, referring
to individuals who delegate their responsibilities to a collective level when those
60 responsibilities are difficult to discharge at the individual level. However, we will argue
that delegating responsibility to a collective level can only exonerate the individual
if it is done in a consistent way; otherwise it is nothing more than blame-shifting or
displacing responsibility. Hiding behind the delegated authority model should then be
characterised as a mechanism of moral disengagement4 through which people deny
65 their individual responsibility in an unjustifiable way. We will attempt to settle this
matter and explore how this affects our responsibility for tackling climate change.
HUMAN RIGHTS THREATENED BY CLIMATE CHANGE
Recent literature has drawn attention to the impact of climate change on human
rights.5 An important contribution has been provided by Simon Caney, who defines
70 human rights as ‘minimum moral thresholds to which all individuals are entitled,
simply by virtue of their humanity, and which override all other moral values’.6 He
focuses on three key rights: the right to life; the right to health; and the right to
A. De Smet et al.
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subsistence. Employing a modest and minimal conception of human rights, Caney
demonstrates that anthropogenic climate change violates these rights.7
75 In 2008, expressing concern about the threat climate change poses to the
enjoyment of human rights, the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC)
adopted Resolution 7/23 on Human rights and climate change, requesting the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to prepare
a study on the relationship between climate change and human rights.8 The report
80 submitted by the OHCHR9 was presented and discussed at the tenth session of the
UN Human Rights Council on 15 January 2009. Subsequently, the HRC adopted
Resolution 10/4 on Human Rights and Climate Change, noting that:
Climate change-related impacts have a range of implications, both direct and
indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights, including, inter alia, the right
85 to life, the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of
health, the right to adequate housing, the right to self-determination and human
rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation.10
The OHCHR report describes the influence of climate change on several human
rights codified in the International Bill of Human Rights*consisting of the Universal
90 Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*as well
as other relevant UN treaties and conventions.11 Arguably, the OHCHR report
interprets the human rights at issue in a broader way than Caney’s minimal
conception. To strengthen our argument, we will adopt his minimalist normative
95 position. We will justify our position in the fourth section; here we will start by
elaborating Caney’s account.
First, Caney mentions the right to life.12 The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights states that ‘every human being has the inherent right to life. This right
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’.13 Caney
100 employs a minimal conception of this right as a merely negative right, not making
the more contentious claim that persons have a positive right to have their life
protected against all kinds of threats. Even using this minimal conception, a number
of the observed and projected impacts of climate change will pose a substantial threat
to the right to life. Climate change will result in an increase of the frequency and
105 intensity of extreme weather events such as storms, heat waves, and floods. Since
these disasters already have devastating effects on mortality, their increased
frequency and intensity will jeopardize many people’s enjoyment of the right to
life, particularly in the developing world.14 Climate change poses a significant threat
to human security in general, but of specific relevance here is the observation that
110 some of the factors that increase the risk of violent conflict are sensitive to climate
change, and also to policy responses.15
Second, climate change will have a detrimental impact on the effective enjoyment
of the right to health. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights recognises ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
115 standard of physical and mental health’.16 The full realisation of such a right requires
The delegated authority model and climate change
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inter alia provisions for the reduction of infant mortality, the improvement of
environmental and industrial hygiene, the prevention and treatment of diseases,
and the assurance of medical service and attention in the event of sickness. The
wording in the report of the OHCHR indeed implies a broad interpretation of the
120 right to health. In contrast, Caney’s minimal account affirms only a negative right
‘that other people do not act so as to create serious threats to their health’, since he
considers the conception of the right to health as mentioned in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (aspiring the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health) as maximalist and therefore open to
125 objections by critics.17
Nonetheless, both accounts agree that human-induced climate change clearly
results in a variety of different threats to the right to health, affecting millions of
people, especially those with a low adaptive capacity.18 The IPCC distinguishes three
basic pathways by which climate change affects health.19 First, the increases in
130 the frequency of extreme weather will not only raise mortality (as mentioned above),
but also directly impact human health in general. Second, there are effects mediated
through natural systems. Temperature, precipitation and humidity have a strong
influence on the spread and transmission of vector-borne diseases (such as malaria
and dengue fever), water- and food-borne diseases (such as cholera and other
135 diarrhoeal diseases), and allergic diseases.20 The health impacts of climate change
encompass shifts in the patterns, spread and transmission of these diseases. Finally,
some health impacts that are heavily mediated through human institutions include
nutrition and water insecurity, occupational health concerns (such as heat strain
and heat stroke), mental health problems (in terms of increasing stress as a result
140 of harsher weather conditions), and compounded health risks as a consequence of
increased human movement, social disruptions and conflict (resulting inter alia in the
spread of infectious diseases and malnutrition).21
The third human right under consideration is the right to subsistence. According
to Caney’s minimal conception, ‘all persons have a human right that other people
145 do not act so as to deprive them of the means of subsistence’.22 Climate change
will compound existing food insecurity, particularly threatening smallholder and
subsistence farmers.23 Although impacts will occur unevenly, overall, higher
temperatures and changes in precipitation will reduce both the quantity and quality
of global food yields, result in shifts of fish populations, affect livestock, and possibly
150 lead to food-price shocks. The IPCC concludes with high confidence that ‘climate
change will have a substantial negative impact on (1) per capita calorie availability,
(2) childhood undernutrition, particularly stunting and (3) on undernutrition-
related child deaths and disability-adjusted life years in developing countries’.24
Moreover, climate change will exacerbate water insecurity in many regions, an
155 insecurity which already impairs hygiene, reduces farm yields, increases infectious
diseases, and can become a source of conflict.25 Not only changing temperatures
and precipitation patterns, but also changing run-off patterns, glacial shrinkage and
increasing floods and droughts will substantially compromise flows of water for
irrigation and human consumption.
A. De Smet et al.
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160 In addition to these three fundamental rights, climate change will also impact the
effective enjoyment of other human rights.26 Nonetheless, we will base our
argumentation on the minimalist list of key rights threatened by climate change,
namely the right to life, the right to health, and the right to subsistence, understood
as negative rights.
165 THE DELEGATED AUTHORITY MODEL
The characterisation of anthropogenic climate change as a violation of the basic
human rights to life, subsistence, and health is gaining wide recognition. This
is reflected in the adoption of Resolution 10/4 on Human Rights and Climate Change
by the HRC in 2009. The seriousness of this characterisation should heighten the
170 urgency of tackling climate change. However, as this task appears to be over-
whelming for individuals to perform, people tend to look at the institutional level for
solutions. This idea is at the core of the delegated authority model, which underpins the
legitimacy of political institutions and their leaders, depending on their ability to
solve problems that are difficult to address at the individual level. It has remained
175 largely implicit in political theory, but Stephen Gardiner27 makes the model explicit:
According to a long tradition in political theory, political institutions and their
leaders are said to be legitimate because, and to the extent that, citizens delegate
their own responsibilities and powers to them. The basic idea is that political
authorities act in the name of the citizens in order to solve problems that either
180 cannot be addressed, or else would be poorly handled at the individual level, and
that this is what, most fundamentally, justifies both their existence and their specific
form.
In the case of climate change, the delegation of responsibilities has failed to be
successful. According to Gardiner, responsibility for this failure most directly falls on
185 recent political leaders and current institutions, especially since they have assumed
the mantle of responsibility and have acted as if they were capable of discharging this
role (e.g. by making speeches, promising progress, and organising frequent meetings
under the UNFCCC).28 Hence, since they have failed to discharge the responsi-
bilities delegated to them, they can legitimately be morally criticised for this failure.
190 In the next section we will examine whether this issue really is as straightforward
as it is often depicted. More specifically, we will question whether the failure to
implement a robust policy to tackle climate change necessarily implies that the
relevant institution loses its legitimacy.
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE UNFCCC
195 Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane point out that consent of democratic states is
in itself not sufficient to make a global institution legitimate. Moreover, given the
diversity of moral standpoints, an institution can be legitimate without being fully
just. They propose three ‘substantive criteria’ that institutions should meet in order
to be legitimate: minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit and institutional
The delegated authority model and climate change
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200 integrity.29 We will explain these criteria and assess to what extent the UNFCCC can
be said to meet them, although this is not a straightforward exercise.
The first criterion Buchanan and Keohane propose is ‘minimal moral acceptability’.
To be worthy of our support, an institution must not persist in committing serious
injustices.30 Although the UNFCCC is not committing these injustices directly,
205 it nonetheless fails to prevent the violation of the basic human rights at issue.
Therefore, the legitimacy of the UNFCCC can already be challenged on the basis of
this first criterion. Thanks to ethicists such as Simon Caney and Derek Bell,31 as well
as the report of the OHCHR cited in the second section above, the characterisation
of climate change as a violation of basic human rights is gaining wide recognition.
210 Moreover, at the Conference of Parties in Cancun in 2010, it was acknowledged that
climate change is a major threat to human rights that needs to be urgently addressed
by all parties.32 However, this has not resulted in a strong and binding policy to
avoid such massive violations of human rights by mitigation and/or adaptation. As we
have discussed in the second section, climate change already jeopardizes the human
215 rights to life, health, and subsistence, and this situation is likely to exacerbate. Thus,
even if we only take the normatively minimalist position that a limited list of basic
human rights should at least be respected, the current global governance institution
performs poorly. By violating the duty to respect basic human rights, the UNFCCC
and its member states do not meet the criterion of minimal moral acceptability,
220 implying that its legitimacy has been dealt a sharp blow.
The second criterion for the legitimacy of global governance institutions is
‘comparative benefit’.33 This is a relatively straightforward condition and in line
with the delegated authority model. The justification for having global governance
institutions is primarily instrumental: the basic reason for individuals and states
225 to support these institutions is that they provide benefits that cannot otherwise be
obtained. If an institution cannot effectively provide these benefits, then this failure
undermines its claim to the right to rule. We would have reasons to question whether
those in charge of the institution are genuinely committed to providing the expected
benefits that were invoked to justify the creation of the institution.
230 It is clear that the UNFCCC, in its current form, is not optimally respecting
human rights. Hence, the UNFCCC and its Parties do not appear to deliver the
envisioned benefits, the provision of which is the basic rationale for their justification.
This not only raises doubts about the level of commitment of the actors involved, but
also threatens the legitimacy of the UNFCCC.
235 However, Keohane and Buchanan emphasise that we should understand benefit
here as comparative, which means that ‘[t]he legitimacy of an institution is called
into question if there is an institutional alternative, providing significantly greater
benefits, that is feasible, accessible without excessive transition costs, and meets the
minimal moral acceptability criterion’.34 To settle this matter, much more needs
240 to be said on the concept of ‘feasibility’. We will postpone this discussion to the
following section.
The third criterion that Keohane and Buchanan propose is ‘institutional integ-
rity’.35 This criterion refers to the extent to which the actual performance of an
A. De Smet et al.
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institution and its self-proclaimed goals align. If there is a large disparity between
245 them, we have reason to question the legitimacy of the institution. If an institution
does not meet this criterion, its representatives can be considered ‘either untrust-
worthy or grossly incompetent’.
The UNFCCC defines ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
250 the climate system’ as its ‘ultimate objective’.36 Since global carbon emissions have
rapidly increased in the past two decades, and continue to rise, it is clear that the
UNFCCC falls short on its main objective. This would support the conclusion that
the agents involved in this institution are untrustworthy or incompetent and, hence,
that the UNFCCC does not meet the criterion of institutional integrity. However,
255 in our view, the problem is not that delegates are not concerned about global
warming, but rather that they have conflicting commitments. On the one hand, they
have special obligations towards their compatriots. On the other hand, they have
general obligations towards humanity at large. They need to find a balance between
(perceived) national interests and general interests on a global scale, as we will
260 explain below.
What should we conclude from this brief evaluation? Does its failure to meet one of
the criteria immediately imply that the UNFCCC is illegitimate as a global governance
institution? Buchanan and Keohane refer to John Rawls to conceptualise their three
substantive criteria as ‘counting principles’: ‘the more of them an institution satisfies,
265 and the higher the degree to which it satisfies them, the stronger its claim to
legitimacy’.37 The results of our evaluation of the UNFCCC do not look promising:
the UNFCCC clearly fails the first criterion (minimal moral acceptability), and it
scores rather poorly on the second criterion (comparative benefit). Furthermore, it
does not seem to meet the third criterion (institutional integrity), although we have
270 conceded that this might be due to the conflicting commitments of delegates, rather
than to their untrustworthiness or incompetence. However, Buchanan and Keohane
also argue that it would be excessive to claim that their criteria are necessary conditions,
because there might be extraordinary circumstances in which an institution would
fail to satisfy one or two of them, yet still reasonably be regarded as legitimate. The
275 only way to save the legitimacy of the UNFCCC would be to prove that the current
arrangement really is the best feasible option. If there is no feasible institutional
alternative and the non-institutional alternative would make things even worse, the
UNFCCC could still claim to be legitimate, even if inadequate.38 We will now
examine whether there are valid reasons to underpin this claim.
280 THE FEASIBILITY OF AN INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE
We will start this section by elaborating ‘International Paretianism’, a principle
defended by Eric Posner and David Weisbach.39 In their view, a climate treaty, in
order to be feasible, should not make any of the participating states worse off:
Any treaty must satisfy what we shall call the principle of International Paretianism:
285 all states must believe themselves better off by their lights as a result of the climate
The delegated authority model and climate change
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treaty. International Paretianism is not an ethical principle but a pragmatic
constraint: in the state system, treaties are not possible unless they have the
consent of all states, and states only enter treaties that serve their interests.40
Posner and Weisbach emphasise that International Paretianism is not an ethical
290 principle, but rather a feasibility constraint: ‘It is a device to discipline our thinking to
ensure that our recommendations can actually be implemented’.41 According to
them, the failure of the climate negotiations is caused by focusing too much on
ethically appealing but infeasible proposals. Although acknowledging that exactly
determining feasibility is challenging, they propose to use International Paretianism
295 as the standard. With respect to the climate negotiations, this means that a treaty
must be designed so that all states consider themselves better off than in the status
quo.42 This condition does not preclude a climate treaty, since unabated climate
change will worsen the status quo for most (if not all) states. It does, however,
preclude a treaty that makes certain states ‘net losers’, for example if they would have
300 to pay more than they gain by mitigating climate change.
On this basis, Posner and Weisbach argue that a treaty is only feasible if it serves
the interests of the high emitting states. If not, these powerful states will not comply,
which will substantially undermine the efficacy of the treaty.43 However, Caney
rightly points out that infeasibility should be distinguished from unwillingness.
305 Showing that a proposed obligation is impossible, is indeed relevant, but saying that
certain agents are unlikely to comply, is not a compelling argument to support such a
conclusion:
The emitter cannot say (to borrow Posner and Weisbach’s words) that ‘[f]easibility
rules out’ signing this treaty. He cannot because it is not true: it is quite possible for
310 him to do this. He, therefore, cannot appeal to the infeasibility of committing
himself to Pareto-inferior policies because it is not infeasible for him to reduce his
emissions. Infeasibility here is not a bar. It should be called what is it, namely
‘unwillingness’.44
Posner and Weisbach might argue that it is impossible for elected representatives
315 to adopt a strong climate policy, because they would be voted out of office if they
would do so. According to some climate ethics commentators,45 citizens of
developed countries are unlikely to urge their politicians to negotiate robust climate
policy, since they are likely to be unwilling to bear the economic costs involved and
averse to the curtailment of their material freedoms this is likely to entail. In general,
320 politicians therefore believe that they could be punished if they implement strong
measures. If this is true, they would (at least) partly be justified in thinking that they
should defend national economic interests, instead of an adequate climate policy.46
As their electorate gives them the impression that they will be punished for
implementing an ambitious mitigation plan, this no longer counts as a feasible
325 option. Caney admits that this argument has some plausibility, but thinks it is not
convincing. He argues that members of a political community as a whole can adopt a
stronger climate policy, which refutes the infeasibility-claim.47 If both the elected
A. De Smet et al.
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representatives and the electorate would fulfil their respective responsibilities,
emissions could be significantly reduced.
330 We agree with Caney that a stronger climate policy is in principle feasible for a
political community as a whole. However, this does not necessarily entail that it is
feasible from the perspective of the elected representatives under the current
circumstances. Caney rightly notes that considerations of feasibility always need to
be examined from the point of view of specific agents. We would argue that adopting
335 a stronger climate policy might in fact be infeasible from the perspective of political
representatives and that this infeasibility cannot be reduced to mere unwillingness.
Political representatives seem justified in claiming that there is more at stake since
they have reason to think that they are at risk of being voted out of office.
In contrast to the dominant binary conceptualisation of feasibility (holding that
340 an action is either feasible or infeasible), Holly Lawford-Smith has developed
the concept of ‘scalar feasibility’ as ‘a tool for ranking alternative theories along
one of the dimensions relevant to making decisions about what to actually do’.48
We agree that this provides a more nuanced approach to evaluate the options
available to the political representatives under the UNFCCC. In contrast to the
345 binary understanding, a scalar conceptualisation of feasibility is better suited to
accommodate options that depend on the behaviour of others:
Ending global poverty and achieving global carbon neutrality are both possible. But
we don’t want to say these things are feasible, because we don’t want to count all
merely possible actions as available in the relevant sense, and we certainly don’t
350 want to ignore the importance of collective action problems for infeasibility. The
full solution to the problem, I think, comes from insisting on agent-relativity in
feasibility assessments. By that I mean that it is very important that we distinguish
the agent whose option set we’re interested in from all the other agents upon whose
actions the outcome might depend.49
355 Important to note in this context is that Lawford-Smith assumes that the agents
involved at least try to produce the relevant outcome, primarily because she does
not want to let agents off the moral hook too easily. There are, however, certain
‘soft constraints’ that can limit the feasibility of a proposal. She considers the
three most obvious kinds of soft constraints to be economic, institutional, and
360 cultural constraints. We would submit that the entrenched way in which the
UNFCCC currently functions, represents an institutional soft constraint for the
political representatives. The signing members of the Conference of the Parties,
the decision-making body of the UNFCCC, are professional politicians in their
respective states. Consequently, they have to justify their decisions to their national
365 electorate, which substantially undermines their innovative or game-changing power,
at least as things currently stand. They are incentivised to give disproportionate
priority to their national (short-term, economic) interests, at the expense of
vulnerable people elsewhere.50 This does not make the adoption of a strong climate
policy infeasible in the binary sense, but it clearly makes it less feasible in the scalar
370 sense.51
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9
(page number not for citation purpose)
Can these considerations regarding feasibility save the legitimacy of the
UNFCCC? The answer is no. Given the institutional framework in which the
elected delegates are embedded, we can arguably grant them that they are ‘trying’.
However, Buchanan and Keohane’s conditions of minimal moral acceptability and
375 institutional integrity remain unfulfilled, which means that the UNFCCC can only
be legitimate if it is the best available option (i.e. if it meets the second criterion).
Caney convincingly argued that this is not the case, as members of a political
community as a whole (both politicians and electors) are indeed able to adopt a
stronger climate policy. The introduction of the concept of scalar feasibility does not
380 change this conclusion. It does, however, indicate that individual electors are to
an important extent responsible for the illegitimacy of the UNFCCC. In the last
section we will examine how these conclusions affect the responsibility of individual
agents in tackling climate change.
HOW TO DEAL WITH THE ILLEGITIMACY OF THE UNFCCC ON THE
385 INDIVIDUAL LEVEL?
The delegation of responsibilities to tackle climate change from the individual to the
collective level has obviously not led to success. However, in contrast to the general
perception, we concluded the previous section by acknowledging that this failure
should not in the first place be ascribed to the elected delegates. To a certain extent,
390 their claim that a stronger climate policy is not feasible is justified, since their electors
fail to give them a strong mandate to strive for a robust climate policy. Caney rightly
points out that ‘both elected and electors have responsibilities’.52 The failure of the
electorate to discharge its shared political responsibility severely limits the availability
of feasible options for their political representatives to defend a robust agreement to
395 tackle climate change. The implications of this failed delegation of responsibility for
the responsibility of individual agents are twofold.
No more hiding behind the delegated authority argument
Most people believe that climate change can best be addressed by governments
and supranational institutions*since individual actions lack efficacy. Indeed, Gifford
400 mentions that ‘because climate change is a global problem, many individuals
believe they can do nothing about it as individuals’.53 This rationale underpins the
delegation of responsibility to the collective level.54 The validity of this delegation-
strategy, however, depends on the way in which we actually perform this delegation.
We would submit that the delegation of responsibility has failed in the case of climate
405 change, because the input-side of the model has not fulfilled its part. Most citizens of
developed countries do not urge their politicians to negotiate a robust climate policy,
but rather vote in ways that give them the impression that they could be punished if
they implement strong measures. Politicians thus are (at least partly) justified in
thinking that they should defend national economic interests, instead of an adequate
410 climate policy. As responsibility is not delegated to the collective level in a consistent
A. De Smet et al.
10
(page number not for citation purpose)
way, most citizens of developed, high emitting countries can no longer invoke this
model of political legitimacy as an excuse for the general inaction regarding climate
change.
Hiding behind the delegated authority model should therefore be characterised as
415 a mechanism of moral disengagement.55 This concept refers to the psychological
mechanisms that people widely use to reconstruct a problem in order to evade their
individual responsibility in an unjustifiable way. This tendency for moral disengage-
ment is well known in moral psychology, and should be understood in the broader
context of moral agency. According to Albert Bandura (et al.) moral conduct is
420 motivated and regulated by the on-going exercise of self-reactive influence. This self-
regulatory system operates through self-monitoring, judgemental, and self-reactive
subfunctions:
In this self-regulatory process, people monitor their conduct and the conditions
under which it occurs, judge it in relation to their moral standards and perceived
425 circumstances, and regulate their actions by the consequences they apply to
themselves. They do things that give them satisfaction and build their sense of self-
worth. They refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards,
because such conduct will bring self-condemnation.56
However, people sometimes do behave in ways that violate their moral standards.
430 Since this results in a state of dissonance, which is psychologically uncomfortable,
people are naturally inclined to try to reduce or eliminate this inconsistency.57
An important method to achieve this goal is to convince oneself and others that
one’s reprehensible conduct still falls within moral standards through changing
the perception of one’s actions and reconstructing the situation so as to reduce its moral
435 intensity.58 In this way, moral disengagement enables individuals to engage in
unethical behaviour without facing moral self-condemnation. It resolves the incon-
sistency between one’s moral standards and self-interested conduct by articulating
reasons why the reprehensible conduct is a justifiable or excusable exception to the
general normative rules.59
440 Specifically in the context of climate change, Gardiner has analysed this propensity
of people to psychologically reconstruct (the perception of) their reprehensible
behaviour in terms of moral corruption, which involves the shirking of one’s
responsibilities and off-loading them onto others (especially future people, the poor,
and nature) through deceptive arguments, and thus subverts our understanding of
445 the issue at stake.60 We would argue that two such deceptive arguments or strategies
of moral disengagement are specifically deployed in the attempt to deny individual
responsibility under a delegated authority model, namely displacement and diffusion of
responsibility.61
The underlying idea of displacement of responsibility is that people do not feel
450 personally responsible if they are not (or do not perceive themselves to be) the actual
agents of their actions. Climate change is a collective action problem, for which
‘institutions are the well-known solution’.62 Indeed, large-scale collective action
problems cannot be solved by the isolated actions of even large numbers of individual
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persons.63 In contrast, collective institutions have a great capacity to take measures
455 regarding regulation, enforcement and coordination of climate action, and invest-
ment in renewable energy. There seems to be a widespread belief that national
governments and supranational institutions (such as the UNFCCC) are the only
causally efficacious actors.64 In general, people therefore also appear to blame this
collective level for its failure to address climate change, and (implicitly or explicitly)
460 hold their own obligations to be fulfilled with the delegation of responsibility. In
this way, they invoke the delegated authority argument to exonerate themselves
from blame for the violations of basic human rights we mentioned above. However,
we would argue that they could only be exonerated if they grant their political
representatives a mandate that is robust enough to effectively tackle climate change.
465 If they fail to indicate that they attach great importance to the implementation of a
strong climate policy, they are responsible for the failed delegation of responsibilities
to tackle climate change and can no longer hide behind the delegated authority
model. We would argue that this condition is not met and that we should urgently
recognise that the delegated authority model is being misused to facilitate moral
470 disengagement and to evade responsibility for the violation of basic human rights
entailed by climate change.
The second relevant strategy of moral disengagement is diffusion of responsibility,
through which people aim to exonerate themselves from responsibility by empha-
sising division of labour, group decision-making and collective action. Under a
475 delegated authority model, people might invoke the argument that their individual
vote does not suffice to give a strong mandate to their political representatives
in order to diffuse their share of responsibility for the current inaction. However,
by invoking the argument that their vote does not make any difference at all,
people commit a mistake in moral mathematics, namely ignoring small chances.65 The
480 possible benefit (that is, mandating political representatives to insist on a robust
climate policy) is arguably so large that it outweighs the small cost of voting, even on
the infinitesimal chance that an individual vote might make a difference.
Conversely, it can be maintained that the chance of making a difference is too
small to outweigh the cost of voting, even if the possible benefit is enormous. In each
485 case, however, it is inaccurate to assume that an individual vote does not make
any difference at all, since each individual vote increases the political support for
robust climate change policies and encourages politicians to take such leadership
risks. Although this benefit might be minute, we agree with Cripps that promo-
tional actions (such as voting for and supporting parties that explicitly advocate
490 robust policy measures to tackle climate change) ‘can still contribute to a stockpile of
impetus for collective change’.66 Therefore, rather than convincingly exonerating
people from responsibility, the deceitful reference to the delegation of responsibility
corresponds to moral disengagement through diffusion of responsibility.
Since the delegated authority model is being misused to facilitate moral
495 disengagement (through both displacement and diffusion of responsibility), we are
no longer justified to shift the blame for the failure to effectively tackle climate
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change onto our representatives and the institution they constitute, and we can no
longer deny that we, as individuals, bear an important responsibility.
Take responsibility, both politically and individually
500 How, then, should we understand this responsibility? Gardiner has argued that the
political representatives can legitimately be morally criticised for their failure to
discharge the responsibilities delegated to them. Above we explained why we believe
this statement should be qualified to some extent. We claim that it might arguably be
infeasible for our representatives to implement a stronger policy to tackle climate
505 change, but only because we as the electorate do not fulfil our responsibilities*we
fail to give them a strong mandate to insist on robust climate action. We agree with
Gardiner’s conclusion that the failed delegation of responsibilities does not let
individual citizens off the hook:
If the attempt to delegate effectively has failed, then the responsibility falls back on
510 the citizens again, either to solve the problems themselves or, if this is not possible,
to create new institutions to do the job.67 If they fail to do so, then they are subject
to moral criticism, for having failed to discharge their original responsibilities.68
With regard to the first part of this conclusion, we would submit that there are indeed
good reasons to question whether we should exclusively look at the collective level to
515 tackle climate change*not only because the responsibility falls back on the citizens
when the delegation has failed, but also because ‘what states do must be carried out
ultimately by individuals’.69 Moreover, the potential effect of action undertaken by
individuals and households to reduce their emissions should not be disregarded.
Vandenbergh et al., for example, have identified low-hanging fruits: seven actions
520 which, together, can provide a reasonable chance of reducing annual individual
and household emissions by 7% within 5 years. Gardner and Stern have composed a
short list, consisting of nine immediate, low-cost actions regarding transportation
and living by which individuals and households in the US can reduce their total
direct energy consumption by one-quarter (which would amount to 10% of total
525 national greenhouse gas emissions in the USA). Dietz et al. have specified a
behavioural wedge: some effective, non-regulatory behaviourally oriented policies and
interventions can reduce emissions in the household sector by approximately 20%
within 10 years. The IPCC similarly identifies a whole range of everyday activities
in which behavioural change could result in a high energy saving and greenhouse gas
530 emissions reduction.70
It cannot be denied, however, that states (in principle) have a great capacity to
tackle climate change, and that collective agreements will be necessary in order to
outline climate action, and to take measures that cannot be taken by individuals (inter
alia, regulation and enforcement, coordination, investment in renewable energy, and
535 reduction of fossil fuel subsidies). For this reason, we are not (yet) prepared to give
up on the delegated authority model. According to Gardiner, if the delegation has
failed and individuals are incapable of solving the problem themselves, they should
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create new institutions*or, we would add, reform existing institutions*to tackle
climate change. In our view, acknowledging the political responsibility of individual
540 citizens in determining the policies pursued by the existing institutions is a
precondition for this. Climate change can be tackled by the UNFCCC and the
constituting states, yet we need to make responsible use of the possibilities at hand.
This means that we need to make it clear to our political representatives that we
attach great importance to the effective tackling of climate change. We need to grant
545 our representatives a more robust mandate to take the necessary actions, even if these
are harmful for our national economic interests. We thus have to disassociate
ourselves from the ‘dominant view’ that ‘those involved in the creation and revision
of international laws, treaties, agreements, or conventions or of intergovernmental
agencies and organizations are morally permitted (and perhaps even required)
550 robustly to advance the interests of their home country in such negotiations’.71 In
this way, Thomas Pogge convincingly advocates a cosmopolitan stance, whereby the
design of global institutional arrangements is guided by the needs and interests of all
human beings, weighted equally. As we have argued above, the UNFCCC does not
currently meet this condition.
555 If we fail to grant our representatives a robust mandate to tackle climate change,
we, as citizens, are responsible for the resulting illegitimacy of the UNFCCC.
Moreover, and morally even more problematic, we also become complicit in the
resulting violations of basic human rights:
A citizen giving in to this temptation*disposed for instance to present herself as
560 less likely to vote for the current government if it worked toward global human
rights fulfillment at some expense to domestic economic interests*should then
judge herself [. . .] to be implicated in, and co-responsible for, her government’s
human rights violating negotiating successes.72
Although it remains difficult to establish what exactly one (politically) has to do in
565 order not to be complicit, we believe that the minimal moral obligation citizens have
under the delegated authority model is to vote for parties that explicitly advocate
robust policy measures to tackle climate change, since this way of voting signals a
willingness to accept the costs of a strong climate policy.73 On the one hand, it can be
objected that this obligation is insufficient and that individual citizens have more
570 substantial political obligations to combat climate change. For example, it can be
argued that they have an obligation to ceaselessly protest against the current policy
of the UNFCCC and its constituting states, and to work for more robust green
political movements. We would argue that citizens at least have the obligation to vote
for parties that explicitly advocate robust policy measures to tackle climate change
575 and that this obligation can be compatible with other, more substantial political
obligations.74
On the other hand, some commentators might argue that such an obligation is too
intrusive. Aaron Maltais counters this objection as follows:
[. . .] it should first be made clear that I am not suggesting that individuals can
580 justifiably be coerced to vote a certain way. Rather, the claim is that in order to
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demonstrate sufficient concern for the interests of those who will be harmed by
global warming one at the very least has a moral obligation to vote green. This claim
does not challenge each individual’s democratic and legal right to vote as they see
fit. What it does challenge is the idea that how one votes has some special
585 exemption from moral assessment.75
Especially if we want to invoke the argument that it is the task of national
governments and supranational institutions to address climate change, we at the
very least have the obligation to vote for parties that represent the most likely chance
of success.76
590 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Anthropogenic climate change can clearly be characterised as a violation of at
least the basic human rights to life, subsistence, and health, even when these are
interpreted in a minimal (negative) way. This characterisation should increase the
urgency of tackling climate change, but this task appears to be overwhelming
595 for individuals to perform. People therefore tend to look at the institutional level for
solutions, which is the underlying rationale for the delegated authority model. This
model indeed seems to justify the general idea that addressing climate change is
primarily the job of governments and supranational institutions. In this article we
examined the legitimacy of this argument.
600 We first examined whether the failure to implement an adequate policy to tackle
climate change necessarily implies that the relevant institution (the UNFCCC and its
Parties) loses its legitimacy. To answer this question, we relied on the theoretical
framework developed by Buchanan and Keohane. Since the UNFCCC has not been
able to agree on implementing a robust climate policy, it violates the duty to respect
605 basic human rights, and thus clearly fails the criterion of minimal moral acceptability.
Moreover, although we have conceded that this might be due to the conflicting
commitments of delegates rather than to their untrustworthiness or incompetence,
the UNFCCC does not seem to meet the criterion of institutional integrity for
it clearly falls short on its main objective (namely, to prevent dangerous climate
610 change). Hence the only way the legitimacy of the UNFCCC could be saved is by
proving that the current arrangement really is the best feasible option.
In this regard, we argued that political representatives might indeed claim that a
stronger policy is infeasible from their perspective. The political community as a
whole, however, cannot, because the illegitimacy of the UNFCCC is caused by our
615 failure to fulfil our responsibility at the input-side of the delegated authority model,
rather than being primarily due to the elected representatives. Since we fail to
delegate our responsibility to the collective level in a consistent way, we can no longer
invoke the delegated authority argument as an excuse. In order to make a convincing
claim that it is the task of the government and supranational institutions to address
620 climate change, we at the very least have the obligation to vote for parties that
explicitly advocate robust policies to tackle climate change. If we fail to fulfil this
minimalist task, invoking the delegation of responsibilities is tantamount to moral
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disengagement, namely through diffusion and displacement of responsibility. If we do
not vote for parties that are most likely to make a difference, we can no longer hide
625 behind the delegated authority argument and should accept our complicity in the
massive violations of basic human rights caused by the failure to successfully tackle
climate change.
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